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* Honorable Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr., Senior District Judge for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS







WILLIAM SEIBERLING; CITIFINANCIAL, INC.
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-00031)
District Judge:  The Honorable Malcolm Muir
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 30, 2004
BEFORE: NYGAARD and FUENTES, Circuit Judges, 
and O’NEILL,* District Judge.
(Filed : February 9, 2004)
2___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Tobie Bickle appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees William Seiberling and CitiFinancial, Inc. Because this
frivolous appeal rests solely on an erroneous interpretation of law, we will affirm.
I.
Since we write solely for the parties, only a brief recitation of the facts is
necessary. Bickle was employed for many years in the financial services industry, and was
a branch manager for Avco Financial Services when that company was acquired by The
Associates, which later merged with CitiFinancial. After the merger, Bickle’s position
was eliminated and she was reassigned as a “manager at large.” She resigned this position
after six days, explaining in her resignation letter that she was dissatisfied with the new
salary structure, new deadlines, and extended working hours.
Following her resignation, Bickle filed a complaint against CitiFinancial
and Seiberling, her supervisor. She alleged that she had been forced to engage in illegal
financial practices as a condition of her continued employment, leading to her
constructive discharge. She also alleged that CitiFinancial and Seiberling had defamed
her, causing her financial loss and rendering her unable to practice her profession. The
3defendants moved for summary judgment, supporting their motion with a brief, a
statement of material facts, exhibits, and references to deposition testimony.  Bickle
responded with a brief opposing summary judgment, but did not include a counter-
statement of material facts, as required by local court rules, or any evidence to support her
version of events. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants,
finding that Bickle had failed to establish that any material fact was in dispute. Bickle
now appeals this decision.
II.
Bickle’s appeal is wholly without merit, and demonstrates ignorance of the
law on the part of her attorney. She maintains that because the defendants did not support
their motion for summary judgment with an affidavit, she did not need to respond with
any factual evidence in order to defeat the motion. This proposition is absurd, and clearly
contradicted by settled law.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment,
and specifies that such a motion may be made “with or without supporting affidavits.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Rule 56 further states that when “a motion for summary judgment is
made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Bickle’s contention
4that supporting affidavits are required is based on a section of this rule, taken out of
context, that sets forth the form that affidavits should take, if any are filed. Id.
If the language of Rule 56 is not clear enough on its face, its meaning was
made explicit by the United States Supreme Court in 1986, in a decision rejecting the
precise position that Bickle takes here. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Court ruled that a
motion for summary judgment may be made with or without supporting affidavits, and
that in response, the nonmoving party is required to “go beyond the pleadings and by her
own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’
designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986) (quoting  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) and (e)). Wrote the Court: “[R]egardless of
whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment motion with affidavits, the
motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court
demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule
56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.
III.
Bickle did not provide factual support for any of her claims, or any
evidence to dispute the defendants’ version of the facts. As a result, the District Court was
1. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides a remedy of damages for a party
who is required to defend a legitimate judgment from a frivolous appeal. We will leave it
to Appellees to determine whether they wish to petition for such an award.
5
correct in finding that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, and we will
affirm the grant of summary judgment.1
_________________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Richard L. Nygaard     
Circuit Judge
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